A step further in the theory of regional integration: A look at the Unasur's integration strategy by Bonilla Bolaños, Andrea
A step further in the theory of regional integration: A
look at the Unasur’s integration strategy
Andrea Bonilla Bolan˜os
To cite this version:
Andrea Bonilla Bolan˜os. A step further in the theory of regional integration: A look at the
Unasur’s integration strategy. Working paper GATE 2016-17. 2016. <halshs-01315692>
HAL Id: halshs-01315692
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01315692
Submitted on 13 May 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WP 1617 – May 2016 
 
A step further in the theory of regional integration:  
A look at the Unasur's integration strategy 
Andrea Bonilla Bolaños 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Although economic literature about regional integration is substantial, its definition remains controversial. For 
instance, it is common nowadays for the terms regional integration and regional economic integration to be used 
interchangeably in spite of the importance accorded by literature to non-economic factors of integration, particularly 
to political ones. Inspired on the South American integration project, this paper revisits the theory of regional 
integration and proposes a novel approach for evaluating regional integration initiatives that include not only 
political but also physical aspects. More specifically, this article proposes to analyze any regional integration project 
from three complementary angles: economic integration, political integration, and physical integration. Moreover, it 
argues that political and physical integration constitute a preliminary, or contemporaneous, step toward economic 
integration, and not a final stage, as the current debate suggest. In other words, it is argued that a zero-stage in 
(Balassa, 1961)'s theory of economic integration is needed to enable the long-term sustainability of a regional bloc. 
 
Keywords: 
Economic integration, Physical integration, Political integration, Regional integration, South America, Survey 
 
JEL codes: 
F02, F15 
A step further in the theory of regional integration: A look at the
Unasur’s integration strategy
Andrea Bonilla Bolan˜os
Univ Lyon, Universite´ Lyon 2, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France.
E-mail: bonilla@gate.cnrs.fr
Abstract
Although economic literature about regional integration is substantial, its definition remains
controversial. For instance, it is common nowadays for the terms regional integration and regional
economic integration to be used interchangeably in spite of the importance accorded by litera-
ture to non-economic factors of integration, particularly to political ones. Inspired on the South
American integration project, this paper revisits the theory of regional integration and proposes
a novel approach for evaluating regional integration initiatives that include not only political but
also physical aspects. More specifically, this article proposes to analyze any regional integration
project from three complementary angles: economic integration, political integration, and physical
integration. Moreover, it argues that political and physical integration constitute a preliminary, or
contemporaneous, step toward economic integration, and not a final stage, as the current debate
suggest. In other words, it is argued that a zero-stage in (Balassa, 1961)’s theory of economic
integration is needed to enable the long-term sustainability of a regional bloc.
Keywords. Economic integration; Physical integration; Political integration; Regional inte-
gration; South America; Survey
JEL classification: F02, F15.
1 Introduction
Globalization, changing market conditions, greater competition, and associated uncertainty in inter-
national economic and political relationships have posed new imperatives for the way countries are
organized. The current world is a network of nation states that tend to integrate their economies in
the pursuit of, among others, macroeconomic stability, economic development, efficiency, and active
economic growth.
Economic integration at a regional level seems to be the new global trend. In the past two
decades, several regional blocs have been formed in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, including
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (UEMOA) in 1994, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) together
with China, Japan, and Korea (ASEAN+3) in 1997, the Economic and Monetary Community of
Central Africa (CEMAC) in 1998, the Eurozone in 1999, the East African Community (EAC) in 2000,
the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) in 2008, and the Pacific Alliance in 2011.1 Apart from
the South American regional integration initiative, which emerged as a political alliance, all these
regional blocs are economic associations.
The main difference between the South American strategy (Unasur) and, for instance, the Euro-
pean strategy of integration is precisely the political and economic nuances of their respective projects.
The original purpose of the European Union (EU) and the Eurozone was to bring about economic
integration— it has become the most advanced economic union, according to (Balassa, 1961b)’s the-
ory. On the other hand, the Unasur, despite its Constitutive Treaty declaring it to be a project of
political, economic and social content, up to now functions mainly as a forum for political and strate-
gic discussion to pursue regional cooperation in defense, social development, education and science,
1The reference here is to the ASEAN+3—an exclusively economic association—and not to the ASEAN—a political
and economic association.
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democracy, infrastructure, energy provision, among other areas.2 Put differently, the South American
initiative is an institutional and politically driven regional integration plan whereas the European ini-
tiative is an institutional and economically driven one. This does not mean, however, that the South
American integration project is exclusively political nor that the European one is solely economic. On
the contrary, political integration and economic integration are closely interdependent (see Subsection
3.3).
However, political–economic interdependence is not new in regional integration debates.3 What
is innovative and quite interesting is that, while the European experience suggests the necessity of
political integration as a subsequent step of economic integration, Unasur’s proposition is that political
integration is a necessary prior step of economic integration.
The break with the traditional paradigm of the South American regional integration strategy is
twofold. On the one hand, the earliest regional integration debates affirmed that economic integration
must lead to political integration (Vilfredo Pareto at the Peace Congress at Rome, 1889) and not the
inverse.4 Even the theory of economic integration of Bela Balassa (Balassa, 1961b)—which continues to
be the reference on this topic (Sapir, 2011)—talks about political unity as a crucial means of evolving
toward economic integration stages (see Subsections 3.2 and 3.3), thus, placing economic motives
before political motives and relegating political union to an instrumental role. Balassa (1961b) places
political unification at the end of the process, as a necessary complement of the last stage: total
economic integration. Contrary to the conventional practice, the Unasur approach is that political
aspects prevail over economic ones in the pursuit of regional integration.5
On the other hand, the Unasur’s strategy introduces a new dimension to the traditional regional
integration theory, namely, a physical dimension. The unprecedented Initiative for the Integration
of Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA) is an ambitious regional infrastructure project aimed at creating
interconnected networks of transport, energy, and communications infrastructure over South America’s
12 countries. The economic externalities of such a physical integration plan are numerous, as detailed
in Subsection 3.4. Together with the political element, the physical dimension is a priority in the
Unasur’s agenda. Because investing in infrastructure projects is a structural policy, the physical is
a crucial aspect of regional integration: the sustainability of economically integrated zones is at the
core of a debate since the recent euro debt crisis revealed flaws with the European Monetary Union
(Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz, 2012; Issing, 2011).
Based on the South American integration strategy, regional integration can be analyzed from at
least three angles: economic integration, which includes different degrees or stages of integration—
preferential trade agreements, free trade areas (FTAs), customs unions (CUs), common markets
(CMs), and economic and monetary unions (Subsection 3.2); political integration, which implies greater
depth, coordination, and harmonization of actions among members in the governmental and insti-
tutional spheres, i.e., new regional governance (Subsection 3.3); and physical integration, featuring
regional infrastructure projects as the key drivers (Subsection 3.4) (ECLAC, 2009). All three dimen-
sions are related intimately to each other. Thus, the Unasur integration project has inspired the
development of a new approach to regional integration theory.
Considering the Unasur regional integration project is a matter of interest for at least two reasons.
First, in light of the current debate on economic integration, we should consider the novel approach of
inverting the traditional sequence of evolution toward full regional integration, namely, that political
integration precedes economic integration rather than follows it. Second, considering the physical
integration component as part of a regional integration process that potentially supports economic
integration between countries constitutes a strategic structural regional policy. Such a structural
characteristic potentially guarantees the long-term sustainability of the integrated zone. These reasons
are even more important at a time when there are new challenges for regional governance (as detailed
in Subsection 3.3).
2Section 3 describes the Unasur project of regional integration.
3The debate re-emerged because the European sovereign debt crisis showed that an economic union could not work
without a political union (Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz, 2012; Issing, 2011; Sapir, 2011).
4Pareto’s argument was that customs unions and other international economic organizations constitutes powerful
instruments for improving political relationships.
5The Unasur plan has made major progress on energy, democracy, defense, and drug trafficking, which, according to
(Pen˜a, 2009), are the causes of growing regional interdependence in South America (see Tables 3 and 2).
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In this manner, this article introduces a tri-dimensional approach to the debate on regional inte-
gration by asking whether it is necessary first to add political and physical steps to Balassa’s theory
of economic integration as a means to enable the long-run sustainability of integrated areas through
the structural convergence of their economies. This novel tri-dimensional approach is very rare in
the literature, which assumes political integration as the final stage of economic integration, but it
is certain to appear in discussions of future regional integration projects considering the flaws and
incompleteness of actual economic regionalization unaccompanied by political and physical consider-
ations. Indeed, tackling not only economic but also political and physical integration constitutes a
solid foundation for the integration process and potentially guarantees its sustainability.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the controversies around the term
regional integration highlighting the need for a new approach. In Section 3, it is argued that a three
dimensional approach for evaluating regional integration projects is suitable, the South American
region is chosen as the case of study. And, Section 4 summarize the arguments and concludes.
2 Regional integration: a still changing concept
It is well known, thanks to the rich history of the economic thought, that economic concepts evolve
hand in hand with the society. Like the society, the economic environment is mutable, so, new
theoretical challenges and new controversies appears every day. The theory of regional integration
is not exempted of such a dynamic character of the economic science: despite of being one of the
most studied topics in economics, the very definition of regional integration is still controversial.
Fundamental differences persist not only between the major schools of thought but also among authors
of the same schools of thought (Suarez, 2009). Moreover, the lack of consensus causes confusion
when referring to related topics: it is common for the terms regional integration, regionalism, and
regionalization to be used interchangeably. However, they refer to quite different notions (see Table
1). This section briefly describes the main historical discussions on the concept of regional integration
so that to put context to the proposal of this paper, that is, consider the South American integration
strategy for updating the theory of regional integration.
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The term “regionalism,” according to its suffix ‘ism’ (from the Greek: ismos), refers to the theoretical
dimension of the development process of a region (Tshiyembe, 2012). In the international relations
field, regionalism alludes to any form of institutional cooperation between two or more countries
(Deblock, 2005); yet, regionalism is understood as a political construction conducted by states and
materialized by agreement in order to organize inter-country relationships and promote multifaceted
cooperation between nations (Figuie`re and Guilhot, 2006).
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The term “regionalization,” according to its suffix ‘tion’ (from the Latin: tio), refers to some action or
the result of this action. Thus, it denotes the process and dynamic of regional integration or even the
development process of a region (Tshiyembe, 2012). However, Figuie`re and Guilhot (2006), defines
the term as a concentration of economic flows within a given geographic area.
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Because of generalizations made by the World Trade Organization (WTO), since 1980, the term
regionalism has gradually replaced that of regional integration in reference to any form of institutional
arrangement that aims to liberalize and/or facilitate trade at any level other than multilateral.a
aMeanwhile, Figuie`re and Guilhot (2006) defines economic regional integration as a combination of re-
gionalism and regionalization. That is, an area is said to be regionally integrated only if it reports both
a concentration of trade flows and institutional coordination, which permanently establishes common rules,
between the concerned nations.
Table 1: Regionalism, regionalization, and regional integration definitions
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Originally envisaged as an international expression of the market economy, regional integration repre-
sents a transfer of national economic mechanisms on a broader scale. The first theoretical approaches
equated regional integration with the creation of a free trade area or a customs union. There was
some debate about this neoclassical notion of integration by market. Notably, the distinction by
Viner (1950) between “trade creation” and “trade deflection” prompted discussion that led to the
essence of modern international trade theory.6 The integration processes initiated in different regions
of the world after World War II highlighted the weaknesses of the liberal approach based on the idea
of integration by the market (supported by i.a., Aron, 1953; Bye´, 1958; Ropke, 1959). Therefore,
researchers, especially those in Europe, worked on alternative integration models for dealing with the
number of structural problems led by integration and not covered in the neoclassical framework (e.g.,
Allais, 1972; Balassa, 1961b). In addition, in the early 1960s, other schools, notably, interventionist
authors (e.g., B. Balassa, P. Streeten, P. Robson) and structuralist authors (e.g., C. Kindleberger,
A. Marchal, G. Myrdal, F. Perroux), were interested in the structural changes induced by regional
integration, which ceased to be a static phenomenon symbolized by customs union theory. The new
theories focused on the optimization of the socioeconomic effects of regional integration.
Despite thorough analysis of regional integration, its definition remains controversial. Indeed, re-
gional integration is an extremely complex notion because of its multidimensional and dynamic nature.
On the one hand, the study of regional integration issues draws together several interrelated branches
of knowledge: economics, politics, sociology, governance, and international relations, among others.
Thus, it is difficult to achieve a general definition. For instance, the terms “regional integration” and
“economic integration” or “regional economic integration” are used commonly as synonyms in spite of
the importance accorded to non-economic factors of integration, particularly to political ones (Section
3.3 further describes the political–economic link of regional integration). On the other hand, all re-
gional integration experiences (in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America) are ongoing processes.7 Because
theory evolves hand in hand with these experiences, the conceptualization of regional integration is still
under construction. Up to now, although the European regional integration attempt has been studied
the most, a rich number of paradigms developed to understand how it works (i.a., functionalism and
neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, constructivism, post-modernism—see Box
2.1),8 have not resulted in a satisfactory theory.
Moreover, as revealed by history, countries’ motivations for regional integration are distinct, with
notable differences between developed and developing nations. For instance, since 1960, regional inte-
gration has been adopted by developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia as development
strategies. The perception of integration as a tool within a regional development strategy has been
applied to developing regions using such approaches as integration by the market, complex integration,
the functional approach, and the structural approach (see Box 2.2). This kind of integration, which is
obviously different to European integration, has prompted the development of alternative approaches
to regional integration.
These theoretical approaches of regional integration continued to be debated intensely during the
late 1970s. The literature aimed to understand failed strategies—such as the Latin American Import
Substitution Industrialization (ISI), proposed by Raul Prebish and based on the deterioration of the
terms of trade (Singer, 1950) and trade as a development engine (Prebish, 1950)9—as well as relatively
successful ones—such as the Asiatic Newly Industrialized Countries (NPI). Thereafter, the scientific
and technical revolution (i.e., transportation, mass production, and communication), which created
the conditions for intensive regional integration, did not permit this debate to be diminished and,
indeed, even now, it remains alive. Recently, the European sovereign debt crisis has presented new
challenges to the European approach to regional integration. The role of political, fiscal, and financial
factors have been highlighted strongly (i.a., Issing, 2011; Lane, 2012; Rodrik, 2012; Sapir, 2011). Thus,
6Viner (1950) recognizes that the union of two or more markets does not always expand the wealth of nations.
According to him, the welfare of the members that form a customs union increases only if the resulting trade augmentation
is due to trade creation (i.e., when the most expensive supplier is replaced by the most efficient supplier) and not due to
trade deflection (i.e., when the competitive supplier is displaced by the most expensive supplier).
7Balassa (1961a) differentiates between economic integration as a process and as a state. As no group of countries
has proved to be integrated in the sense of “state,” it is correct to affirm that regional integration is ongoing.
8See Malamud and Schmitter (2007) for further explanation about each theory.
9The Argentinian economist, Raul Prebish, was the leader of a research team that worked in the Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean and inspired the structuralist approach of the period 1950–1970.
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the development of regional integration theory is still a work in progress.
Box 2.1. Brief review of the theoretical foundations of European regional integration
Functionalism
The functionalist approach, also known as liberal institutionalism, considers that nations maximize
their interest owing to the assistance of international organizations based on functional rather than
territorial principles.a According to Mitrany (1946), socioeconomic welfare can guarantee lasting
peace because individuals are rational. Mitrany’s initial proposal for Europe was the creation of
a federation. However, political coordination to achieve this was considered too ambitious and
economic integration was adopted as a necessary first step that would build the foundations for a
political union (guarantee of peace).
Neo-functionalism
This approach places major emphasis on the necessity of a federal organization. More than relying
on functional integration in the economic and social sectors, this form of integration should be
based on acts of political will (Vieira-Posada, 2006). Moreover, neo-functionalism emphasizes the
role of institutions to achieve further integration. A number of extensions have been proposed to
this approach (i.a., Haas, 1968; Nye, 1970; Schmitter, 1970).
Intergovernmentalism
According to this approach, state power must match national interest. The orientation and velocity
of regional integration is determined by the interaction of sovereign national states. Whether the
process goes forward or backward or stagnates depends on national interests and the relative power
that can be brought to bear on any specific issue (Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1998).
There are copious numbers of theories used to understand the European integration process, as
shown in the figure below. However, up to now, no theory has been satisfactory.
Theories used to understand the European integration process
Nor are these disputes over concepts and assumptions purely academic. As we shall see, one is
likely to draw very different lessons for other world regions from each of these theories/approaches.
One of the main tasks of any scholar trying to assess the prospects of integration in MERCOSUR will
be to select that theory (or theories) in Figure 1 that is or are most apposite for the peculiar conditions
of his or her embryonic region.
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treaties or th t fed ralism gives to constitutions, but it denies any transform tive potential.
Supranational regulation is seen as a technocratic imperative generated by highly interdependent
economies and societies, but not something that changes the basic nature or autonomy of national
politics (Majone 1996).
However, as one can see in Figure 1, there are many other candidates for the job of explaining and,
thereby, producing generic lessons about regional integration. Especially since it was re-launched in the
mid-1980s with the Single European Act, the EU has become once again a very lively site for theoretical
speculation. Hardly a year does not pass that someone does not come up with a new theory and, even more
surprisingly, manages to convince another group of scholars to produce a collective volume extolling its
virtues. “International regime analysis,” “the regulatory approach,” “liberal intergovernmentalism,” “the
policy-network approach,” “the fusion-thesis,” “multi-level governance,” “institutionalism,”
“rationalism,” “constructivism,” “reflectivism” and “post-modernism” have all followed each other over
the past years and managed to find themselves a place somewhere in Figure 1.
Figure 1
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Source: Malamud and Schmitter (2007)
aFunctionalism is a framewo k for building theory that views society as a complex system whose
parts work together to promote solidarity and stability (Gerber and Macionis, 2010, p. 14).
This paper contributes to the debate on the theory of regional integration by focusing on the South
American case. Thus, the retained definition henceforth is that proposed by the Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC): “Regional integration is the process by which diverse
national economies seek mutual gains by complementing one another more.” (ECLAC, 2009). Such a
broad definition involves not only economic aspects but also, among others, political,cultural, social
and political fields. Accordingly, regional integration do not exclusively refer to economic integration.
Economic integration is an integral part of regional integration, it is not the whole regional integration.
On this basis, this paper argues that any regional integration project should be analyzed at least from
three complementary angles: economic (see Subsection 3.2), political (see Subsection 3.3), and physical
(see Subsection 3.4). The necessity to adopt such a three dimensional approach for studying regional
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integration is justified next (Section 3).
Box 2.2. Traditional approaches to integration between developing countries
Integration by market
In the early 1960s, the economic thought of regional integration was limited to the theory of interna-
tional trade, even if some links with development theory had been established. Notably, this period
is characterized by the benefits that developing countries could obtain from economic integration
(e.g., Allen, 1961). However, this approach is contested because the increase of mutual trade is
considered to replace merely one form of dependence for another (Langhammer, 1977).
Complex integration
This approach extends that of integration by market through the incorporation of two aspects: i)
developed and developing countries are so different that the nature of integration between them
is necessarily distinct and ii) the heterogeneity of development levels among developing countries
needs to be considered by integration theory. Integration between developed countries is constructed
based on their existing interdependence of high technological levels of production while integration
between developing countries first needs to assure fundamental structural changes and boost eco-
nomic growth—that is, the integration process is induced rather than results from the development
level (Dragomanovic, 1969). The harmonization of industrial, fiscal, commercial, and monetary
rules is considered to guarantee market integration (Balassa and Stoutjesdijk, 1978). The role of
government intervention in harmonization has been debated (Brown, 1961).
Functional approach
Functionalist authors aim to develop an interdisciplinary theory of development based on a different
international economic order. The main characteristics of the functional approach are:
• awareness of the complex reasons behind the disappointing results of the integration processes
(not only the economic processes);
• more realistic definitions of the benefits that developing countries could obtain when inte-
grating each other; and
• meticulous development of alternative strategies and instruments for integration.
Structuralist approach
By considering again the lessons of third world integration processes, the structuralist approach
deals with regional integration from a sociological perspective.a According to this approach, the
factors that determine the success (or failure) of regional integration–cooperation processes among
developing countries are both economic and political.
• Economic factors
1. The region’s global development level and the development differences among member
countries.
2. The existing level of economic interdependence between member countries.
3. The complementarity of resources and production factors.
4. The chosen integration model and the applicability of integrating policies.
• Political and institutional factors
1. The level of political willingness and institutional stability.
2. The degree of political homogeneity within the group; notably, the sociopolitical system
in force in member countries.
3. The efficacy of national and common institutions and their capacity to adapt to ongoing
changes.
4. Member countries’ configuration of foreign relations.
aIn the late 1970s, regional integration in all developing regions was in serious crisis. Three phenomena
characterized the crisis, although to varying degrees in each region: integration was forsaken as an instru-
ment of development policy; the results had not met expectations; and consequently, integration among
developing countries offered weak expectations. Before the debt crisis (1982), Latin America opted for im-
port substitution as an industrialization strategy in its regional integration policies, leading to numerous
detrimental economic effects for its developing countries (see Lizano, Hughes, and Patel, 1976).
3 A three dimensional view of regional integration
3.1 The Union of South American Nations as the inspiration of a new approach
As mentioned in Section 2, countries motivations for regional integration have been different through
history. Up to know, globalization appears to sentence countries, especially developing ones, to “Join,
or Die”. It is not a coincidence that many regional blocs have formed in the last two decades in
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Africa (the SADC in 1992, the UEMOA in 1994, the CEMAC in 1999, the EAC in 2000), Asia (the
ASEAN+3 in 1997), Europe (the Eurozone in 1999), and America (the Unasur in 2008, the Pacific
Alliance in 2011). This contemporaneous “integration trend” has an interesting characteristic: it
targets economic objectives for integration. Indeed, almost all the regional blocs that have been
created since the early nineties are economic integration initiatives. All but one, the Union of South
American Nations (Unasur). The South American case deserves special attention because, unlike the
other blocs above, the Unasur emerged as a political alliance. The Unasur Constitutive Treaty, signed
in 2008 and ratified in 2011, formalizes the union as a juridical entity that integrates 12 independent
nations in cultural, social, economic, and political fields.10. The group seeks the multidisciplinary
goal of “eliminating socioeconomic inequality [...] and reduce asymmetries” between South American
residents.11 The South American integration strategy is thus breaking the trend.
Table 2: South American regional integration process: Unasur step by step.
Main decisions.
Date Event Decision
September 1, 2000
SA∗ presidents 1st meeting
(Brasilia, Brazil)
Signature of the “Brasilia Statement” expressing the willing-
ness to organize regional integration. IIRSA inception.
December 2000
Meeting of SA ministers of
transport, energy, and commu-
nications
(Montevideo, Uruguay)
Approval of the IIRSA Action Plan 2000–2010.
December 6, 2002
SA presidents 2nd meeting
(Brasilia, Brazil)
Signature of the The Free Movement and Residence Agree-
ment between Mercosur members, Bolivia and Chile.
December 8, 2004
SA presidents 3rd meeting
(Cusco, Peru)
Signature of the “Cusco Declaration” creating the South
American Community of Nations (CASA) (see Box ??). Ap-
proval of the first IIRSA projects portfolio.
September 30, 2005
1st summit of CASA members’
heads of state
(Brasilia, Brazil)
Approval of the first “Priority Agenda” and “Action Plan” of
the CASA.
December 9, 2006
2nd summit of CASA mem-
bers’ heads of state
(Cochabamba, Bolivia)
Study of the final document elaborated by “Strategic Commis-
sion of Reflection.” Approval of the SA regional integration
model.
April 16, 2007
2nd extraordinary meeting of
CASA
(Isla Margarita, Venezuela)
Creation of the SA Energy Council (CES). Renaming of CASA
to become the Union of South American Nations (Unasur).
May 23, 2008
Extraordinary summit of Una-
sur members’ heads of state
(Brasilia, Brazil)
Approval and signing of “The Constitutive Treaty of the
Unasur.”
December 16–17, 2008
Extraordinary summit of Una-
sur members’ heads of state
(Salvador de Bahia, Brazil)
Creation of the SA Defense Council (CDS) and the SA Health
Council (CSS). First meeting of the CDS.
August 10, 2009
3rd summit of Unasur mem-
bers’ heads of state
(Quito, Ecuador)
Assumption of the Pro-Tempore Presidency of Unasur by
the Republic of Ecuador. Creation of the SA Council on
World Drug Traffic; SA Council of Infrastructure and Plan-
ning (Cosiplan); SA Council of Science, Technology and Inno-
vation (Cosucti); SA Council of Social Development (CSDS);
and SA Culture Council (CSC).
October 1, 2010
Extraordinary summit of Una-
sur members’ heads of state
(Buenos Aires, Argentina)
Signature of the “Buenos Aires Declaration’ strongly rejecting
any coup d’etat attempt in support of Ecuadorian President
Rafael Correa. Unanimously approved imposition of sanctions
to any future breach of constitutional order and democracy.
November 26, 2010
4th summit of Unasur mem-
bers’ heads of state
(Georgetown, Guyana)
Guyana assumes the Pro-Tempore Presidency of Unasur. Ap-
proval and signing of the “Additional Protocol to the Constitu-
tive Treaty of Unasur on Commitment to Democracy.” Cre-
ation of the SA Council of Economics and Finance (CSEF).
...continued on next page...
10See Arts. 1 and 2 of the Unasur Constitutive Treaty
11See Art. 2 of the Constitutive Treaty of Unasur.
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...continued from previous page...
March 11, 2011
Meeting of Unasur members’
foreign affairs ministers
(Quito, Ecuador)
Formal entry into force of the Constitutive Treaty of the
Unasur. Nine instruments of ratification deposed according
to Article 26 of the Treaty.
July 28, 2011
Extraordinary summit of Una-
sur members’ heads of state
(Lima, Peru)
Approval of the “Declaration of July 28: Commitment against
inequality” recognizing the importance of undertaking inte-
gration process as a tool for poverty reduction and social in-
clusion. A Social Agenda of Priority Actions for the bloc is
discussed.
August 24, 2011
Meeting of Unasur members’
foreign affairs ministers
(Buenos Aires, Argentina)
Ratification of the Unasur–Argentina Agreement establishing
the functioning of the Center of Strategic Defense (CEED)’s
headquarters in Argentinian territory.
October 29, 2011
4th summit of Unasur mem-
bers’ heads of state
(Asuncion, Paraguay)
Creation of the SA Electoral Council (CEU).
June 29, 2012
Extraordinary summit of Una-
sur members’ heads of state
(Mendoza, Argentina)
Exclusion of Paraguay from the Unasur and Mercosur because
of the coup d’etat in which the Paraguayan congress decided to
depose President Fernando Lugo and transfer the Presidency
to Federico Franco. Defined as a non-democratic act.
December 1, 2012
6th summit of Unasur mem-
bers’ heads of state
(Lima, Peru)
Approval of the Cosiplan proposal of 31 priority infrastructure
projects (Integration Priority Agenda, API). Unanimously
adopts establishment of a South American citizenship
(same rights, including work and no passport). Ratification
of decision to support the peace process of Colombia–FARC.
August 15, 2013 Extraordinary summit of Una-
sur members’ heads of state
Paraguay is reintegrated as a member after report presented
by the Electoral Council members.
March 19, 2014 Extraordinary summit of Una-
sur members’ heads of state
Entry into force of the “Additional Protocol to the Constitu-
tive Treaty of Unasur on Commitment to Democracy” after
ratification by all signatory members’ parliaments.
March 21, 2014
Ministers of foreign affairs
meeting
Creation of a South American Dispute Resolution Center for
investment issues.
December 5–6, 2014
8th summit of Unasur mem-
bers’ heads of state
(Quito, Ecuador)
Sanction of the establishment of the South American Pass-
port and activation of the Bank of the South. The bloc also
commits to create a Regional Reserve Fund and to start stud-
ies for the adoption of the regional compensation mechanism
(SUCRE).
March 15, 2015 Extraordinary summit of Una-
sur members’ heads of state
Request of repeal of US Executive Decree sanctioning
Venezuela. Unasur supports Venezuela but demands its gov-
ernment respect human rights.
April 10, 2015
Extraordinary summit of Una-
sur members’ heads of state
(Quito, Ecuador)
Heads of state outline creation of the South American Parlia-
ment.
Source: Author’s elaboration using several official Unasur reports and documents
* SA: South American; IIRSA: Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America.
Despite its Constitutive Treaty declaring it to be a project of political economic and social content,
up to know the Unasur functions as a forum for political and strategic discussion to pursue regional
cooperation in, among others areas, defense, education and science, democracy, and infrastructure.
Unasur is thus a politically driven integration initiative—as described in Table 3, the South America’s
concrete actions toward regional integration originate from political agreements reached within Unasur.
As detailed in Section 3.3, political agreement is crucial for economic integration. In fact, the political-
economic interdependence is not new in regional integration debates: already in 1841, Friedrich List
affirmed that economic union and political union are inseparable (List, 1841). What is new is that while
the traditional theory understand political integration as a subsequent step of economic integration
(Balassa, 1961b), the Unasur’s initiative suggest that political integration is a necessary prior step of
economic integration. This is the first break with the traditional theory: placing political unification
at the end of integration process for achieving “total economic integration”, as stated by the Balassa’s
theory of economic integration (reviewed in Section 3.2), is not the only valid regional integration
strategy. What is more, the Unasur’s strategy of regional integration is potentially superior to (Balassa,
1961b)’s one considering the lessons led by the crisis of the European Monetary Union (EMU) (Issing,
2011).
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Table 3: Timeline of South America’s concrete actions toward regional inte-
gration.
Date Action Axis
December 9, 2007
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela sign
the foundation agreement of the Bank of the South, which is conceived as a
regional development bank and monetary fund.
Economics/Finance
November 2008
ALBA members and Ecuador adopt a Unitary System of Regional Payments
(SUCRE).
Economics/Finance
October 17, 2009 SUCRE enters into force. Economics/Finance
July 6, 2010 Venezuela and Ecuador conduct the first bilateral transaction through the
SUCRE.
Economics/Finance
September 2010
Construction of an SA Fiber Optic Intercontinental Ring is approved by the
SA Energy Council.
Energy
November 2011 All Unasur members agree to disclose their military spending. Defense
September 15–20, 2012 1st International Festival Cine-Unasur takes place in San Juan Argentina. Culture
May 2012 SA Defense Council approves creation of an anti-transnational crime commis-
sion.
Defense
September 3, 2012 Construction of the SA Fiber Optic Intercontinental Ring starts. Energy
March 12, 2012 SA Electoral Council passes a regulation for election observation missions. Electoral/Democracy
March 23, 2012 Creation of an SA Observatory on Drugs is approved. Drug Fight
April 10, 2012 SA Council of Social Development approves an Action Plan against poverty. Social Developm.
May 19, 2012 SA Energy Council signs an energy agreement for the defense of regional
resources.
Energy
July 12, 2012 All SA nations decide to participate in the development of military aircraft. Defense
March 2013 SA Education Council agrees to a 5-year regional strategic plan of education. Education
March 27, 2013
All tourism ministers of the Unasur members agree to a regional plan for a
coordination and monitoring mechanism on tourism matters.
Economics/Finance
April 15, 2013 2nd stage of the Unasur I aircraft project is announced. Defense
May 18, 2013
SA Science and Technology Council approves the creation of a regional fund
for science and technology projects.
Science/Technology
May 2013 Creation of the SA Defense College is approved by the SA Defense Council. Defense
June 10, 2013
SA Economics and Finance Council commits to promote the entry into force
of the Bank of the South.
Economics/Finance
June 20, 2013 Official announcement of construction of the Unasur Parliament building in
San Benito-Bolivia.
Electoral/Democracy
September 20–28, 2013 2nd International Festival Cine-Unasur takes place in San Juan Argentina. Culture
March 13, 2014
SA Education Council commits to organize the regional recognition of qual-
ifications and standardization of university courses of higher education insti-
tutions in South America.
Education
July 23, 2014
SA World Drug Problems Council approves creation of the South American
Anti-drug Observatory.
Drug Fight
Jun 24, 2014
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela agreed to finance the construction
of the Unasur I aircraft. Defense
June 24, 2014
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela agree to finance construction of
the Unasur I aircraft.
Public Safety
July 24–25, 2014
SA Economics and Finance Council elects the executive board and president
of the Bank of the South. In addition, capital contributions for the regional
bank are secured.
Economics/Finance
July 25, 2014
SA Council of Science, Technology, and Innovation approves a scholarship
program to start in 2015.
Science/Technology
...continued on next page...
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...continued from previous page...
August 8, 2014
The statute and regulations of the South American Defense College is sanc-
tioned by the SA Defense Council. Defense
September 12–19, 2014 3rd International Festival Cine-Unasur takes place in San Juan Argentina. Culture
October 15, 2014
SA Health Council commits to create a medicines prices bank and a map of
the potential to produce medicines in the region. Health
November 23, 2014
Deputy foreign ministers of Unasur members complete and sign a proposal
for the “Unasur strategy vision on energy and road integration.” In addition,
they reach agreement on the Regional Passport to be presented at the summit
of heads of state.
Electoral/Democracy
December 5, 2014 Inauguration of Unasur’s headquarters in Quito.
February 10, 2015
Implementation of the “Drug Observatories Network” project that seeks to
standardize and promote studies on drugs and drug policy in the region.
Drug Fight
April 16, 2015
Ecuador declares April 17 as the “Day of Unasur” (Official Gazette No. 40
641).
April 17, 2015 Inauguration of the SA Defense College, located in Quito-Ecuador. Defense
April 22, 2015
SA Regional Plan for Prevention and Cancer Control is announced and ap-
proved by the Unasur health ministers. Health
Additionally,
• All the Unasur councils have approved theirs statutes and strategic action plans.
• The Unasur is the undisputed official observer of all electoral processes in the region.
• The Unasur is the mediator of conflicts in the region, such as the Chevron–Ecuador dispute (March 2013), the recent
US–Venezuela diplomatic dispute (March–May 2015), and the Colombia–Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
peace negotiation.
• A considerable number of meetings, seminars, trainings workshops, planning workshops, and forums have been organized
by each Unasur commission in order to analyze and organize their integration actions.
Author’s elaboration using several press notes and official communications.
Notes: The table summarizes the main SA regional integration projects. Regional infrastructure projects are not included
because of their significant number. Some information about the 2015-IIRSA portfolio is however provided in this section.
SA: South American; ALBA: Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America.
Two dimensions of regional integration are evident so far, the political one and the economic one.
The second break with the traditional view argued here is that a third dimension must be consid-
ered: the physical one. Regional integration can simply not exist if the involved countries are not
physically interconnected. The physical (or infrastructure) integration is thus crucial. Once again,
the South American integration project stands out: since 2000, even before the official inception
of the Unasur (see Table 2), the 12 South American nations have engaged in a process of regional
integration, for which physical integration is a major pillar. The so-called “Initiative for the Integra-
tion of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA)” proposes the creation of interconnected
networks of transport, energy, and communication infrastructure at regional level.12 The IIRSA is
an unprecedented and ambitious initiative: according to the 2015 IIRSA Portfolio, this initiative is
composed of 593 structural infrastructure projects—with an estimated investment of US $182,436
millions—of which 19.4% (115) have already been completed, 32.2% (191) are in the execution stage,
29.2% (176) are in the pre-execution phase, and 19.2% (114) are being profiled.13 In addition to the
implied investment and consequent economic impacts, perhaps, the most attractive characteristic of
this initiative is its proposal of a new division of territorial spaces. National borders are no longer
the reference. As detailed in Box 3.1, the South American continent is divided by Integration and
Development Hubs (EIDs), an unprecedented territorial conception that distinguishes 10 strategic
South American sub-regions. Certainly, numerous economic dynamics emerge from such a design. In
fact, the physical-economic interdependence of regional integration, detailed in Section 3.4, is very
intuitive. Even though two countries decide to eliminate commercial barrier between them (become
12In 2008, the formation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) provided IIRSA with a new institutional
framework and asserted its continuity. Later in 2011, the South American Infrastructure and Planning Council (Cosiplan)
assumed this coordination role and defined the Strategic Action Plan, 2012–2022.
13It is worth mentioning that IIRSA is Unasur’s most advanced project. The initiative has been cataloged as a process
of “silent” integration because, despite the difficulties in political and economic integration (e.g., political frictions from
Paraguay’s expulsion from the bloc owing to the 2012 coup d’etat), physical integration continues to work (ECLAC,
2009)
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a free trade area), their bilateral trade volumes will not increase if there are not roads or bridges
physically interconnecting their territories.
Box 3.1. IIRSA organizational pillars
In addition to the “the IIRSA Action Plan 2000–2010,” during the Montevideo meeting (December
2000), the ministers of transport, energy, and communications of the 12 South American nations
defined the two basic pillars of the IIRSA, the Integration and Development Hubs EIDs and the
Sectoral Processes PSIs, which complement each other.
An EID is defined as a multinational territorial space involving specific natural resources, human
settlements, production areas, and logistics services. Transportation, energy, and communications
infrastructure serve as its links as they facilitate the flow of people, goods and services, and infor-
mation within this territorial space and from/to the rest of the world. Accordingly, infrastructure
requirements have been identified for each EID. The 10 hubs of the IIRSA, adopted at the Fifth
Meeting of the executive steering committee (Santiago de Chile, December 2003), are as follows,
1. Amazon Hub
2. Andean Hub
3. Southern Andean Hub
4. Capricorn Hub
5. Guianese Shield Hub
6. Paraguay–Parana´ Waterway Hub
7. Central Interoceanic Hub
8. MERCOSUR–Chile Hub
9. Peru-Brazil–Bolivia Hub
10. Southern Hub
The EID concept is based on subregions rather than countries, and thus, in some way, it “erases
borders” when establishing projects (as illustrated below). Each hub includes a number of specific
infrastructure projects detailed in the IIRSA project portfolio.
Ejes de Integración y Desarrollo
Referencia geoeconómica de planificación territorial y gestión del desarrollo sostenible
Eje Andino
Eje Perú-
Brasil-Bolivia
Eje de la Hidrovía 
Paraguay-Paraná
Eje de 
Capricornio
Eje Andino 
del Sur
Eje del Escudo 
Guayanés
Eje del 
Amazonas
Eje Interoceánico 
Central
Eje MERCOSUR-
Chile
Eje del Sur
Andean Hub Guianese Shield Hub
Peru-B azil-
Bolivia Hub Amazon Hub
Paraguay-Paran´ Central
Waterway Hub Interoceanic Hub
Capricorn Mercosur-
Hub Southern Chile Hub
Southern Southern Hub
Andean Hub
Source: BID-INTAL (2011). IIRSA 10 years later: achievements and challenges
In turn, the Sectoral Integration Processes (PSI) concept was introduced aimed at identifying the
regulatory and institutional obstacles hindering the development and operation of basic infrastruc-
ture in the region. In addition, it was aimed at proposing actions to overcome such obstacles. Seven
PSIs have been identified in the IIRSA, as follows:
• Instruments for funding regional physical integration processes
• Energy integration
• Facilitation at border crossings
• Information and communication technologies
• Air transport operating systems
• Maritime transport operating systems
• Multimodal transport operating systems
On this basis, and inspired by the South American integration strategy, this paper argues that
any regional integration project can be analyzed from at least three complementary angles: economic
integration, which includes different degrees or stages of integration—preferential trade agreements,
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free trade areas (FTAs), customs unions (CUs), common markets (CMs), and economic and monetary
unions (Subsection 3.2); political integration, which implies greater depth, coordination, and harmo-
nization of actions among members in the governmental and institutional spheres, i.e., new regional
governance (Subsection 3.3); and physical integration, featuring regional infrastructure projects as the
key drivers (Subsection 3.4) (ECLAC, 2009). All three dimensions are related intimately to each other
as justified in what follows.
3.2 Economic integration
According to the theory of economic integration by Balassa (1961a), the term “economic integration”
refers to both a process and a state of affairs. As a state of affairs, it is the “absence of various forms of
discrimination between national economies.” As a process, it includes “measures designed to abolish
discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states.”
Accordingly, Balassa’s theory distinguishes five degrees or stages of integration that are increasingly
demanding in terms of the removal of discriminatory measures: an FTA, where tariffs and quotas
are abolished against member countries but individual tariffs and quotas are retained against third
countries; a CU, which is an FTA that sets up common tariffs and quotas, if any, for trade with non-
members; a CM, which is a CU that abolishes non-tariff barriers to trade (product and services markets
integration) as well as restrictions on factor movement (factor market integration); an economic union,
where, besides the free circulation of products and factors of production, member states undertake
“some degree of harmonization of national economic policies, in order to remove discrimination that
was due to disparities in these policies” (Balassa, 1961a, p. 2); and total economic integration (TEI),
which entails “the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies” and “the setting-
up of a supra-national authority whose decisions are binding for the member states” (Balassa, 1961a,
p. 2). Table 4 illustrates these stages and provides some examples.
Each one of these stages has been the subject of numerous studies. Viner (1950)’s seminal work
“The Customs Union Issue” is the basis for CU theory. The literature has tended to tackle FTAs
and CUs almost as synonyms.14 Viner’s approach, which is mostly commercial, treats CUs (and
sometimes CMs) as FTAs focusing on the removal of trade barriers.15 This trade viewpoint is related to
the literature on “regional trade agreements” (RTAs)—see Baldwin and Venables (1995); Panagariya
(2000) for surveys about the literature on trade integration.16 In contrast to the RTA literature,
Balassa (1961a,b) covers not only economic but also political matters focusing on: i) the welfare
implication of integration for the involved countries and ii) whether CUs and CMs lead to higher levels
of integration with increasingly demanding coordination of supra-national institutions and policies.
In addition, monetary union issues (corresponding to the fourth stage) have interested authors
widely since the famous article of Mundell (1961), “A Theory of Optimum Currency Area,” and the
seminal contributions of McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). The main notion is that a country
benefits by joining a monetary union if the savings it would obtain in transaction costs are greater
than the costs induced by forgoing the national exchange rate and monetary policy. Adjustment costs
depend directly on the asymmetry of the disturbances an economy is facing, that is, when faced with
asymmetric shocks, countries would suffer higher adjustment costs induced by a common policy that
may not be the most appropriate. The optimum currency area (OCA) theory establishes the criteria
counterbalancing these costs (see Box 3.2). These criteria are interpreted as prerequisites for the
formation of a monetary union. There are numerous empirical and theoretical contributions to OCA
theory.17
14According to Viner (1950), FTAs are simply incomplete CUs. Balassa (1961a) notes that the only significant
difference between FTAs and CUs is the possibility of “trade reflection” originating from disparities in external tariffs
among FTA members (see footnote 6).
15Despite his commercial approach, Viner (1950) is conscious of the relationship between CUs and political unions.
Indeed, he asserts that political unions typically precede CUs and notes that the German Zollverein, in which the CU
came first, was a special case.
16The RTA literature focuses on both the welfare implications of RTAs for their members and on whether trade blocs
act as “building blocks” for or “stumbling blocks” to global free trade.
17See, among others, Dellas and Tavlas (2009); Mongelli (2002); Tavlas (1993) for a complete survey of the OCA
theory.
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Box 3.2. The optimum currency area (OCA) theory
An OCA is defined as “the optimal currency geographic domain of a single currency, or of several
currencies, whose exchange rates are irrevocably pegged and might be unified” (Mongelli, 2002).a
This common, or pegged, currency can fluctuate only with those of the rest of the world. An OCA’s
optimal character is determined based on a number of OCA properties or “criteria”: the mobility
of production factors, price and wage flexibility, economic openness, diversification in production
and consumption, similarity in inflation rates, fiscal integration, and political integration, among
others. These properties reduce the usefulness of nominal exchange rate adjustments within the
currency area by promoting internal and external balance, diminishing the impact of certain kinds
of shocks.
The traditional OCA criteria, developed during the “pioneer phase” of OCA theory (Mongelli,
2002), are as follows:b
• The existence of nominal prices and wage flexibility within countries sharing a common
currency reduces the need for exchanges rate adjustments after a disturbance because it
is unlikely to be associated with sustained unemployment in one country and inflation in
another (Friedman, 1953; Kawai, 1987).
• High mobility of factors of production can lessen the necessity to alter real factor prices
and nominal exchange rates between countries in response to disturbances owing to the
reallocation created by factor market integration (Mundell, 1961). Although labor mobility
is usually low in the short run, because of migration and retraining costs, it could be higher in
the medium and long run, facilitating the adjustment after permanent disturbances (Corden,
1972).
• Financial market integration allows temporary adverse disturbances to be softened by
capital inflows, thereby reducing the need for exchange rate adjustments (Ingram, 1962).
• The higher the degree of economic openness, the less useful the nominal exchange rate
would be as an adjustment instrument because the higher openness is, i) the more changes
in international prices would impact on domestic prices directly and indirectly, and ii) a
devaluation would be transmitted more rapidly to the price of tradable goods and the cost
of living, negating its intended effects (McKinnon, 1963).
• A higher diversification in production and consumption (i.e., in the jobs portfolio, and
in imports and exports) decreases the possible impacts of shocks specific to an individual
sector, thus, reducing the need for changes in the terms of trade (Kenen, 1969).
• When countries have similar (and low) inflation rates, the terms of trade would remain
relatively stable, in turn, fostering more balanced current account transactions and trade,
and thus, reducing the need for nominal exchange rate adjustments (Fleming, 1971).
• Fiscal integration. Nations sharing a supra-national fiscal transfer system, which allows
them to redistribute funds to member nations affected by adverse asymmetric disturbances,
would facilitate the adjustment to such shocks and might require less nominal exchange rate
adjustments (Kenen, 1969).
• Political integration. Willingness within a group of countries contemplating the adoption
of a single currency, among other effects, fosters compliance with joint commitments, sus-
tains cooperation on various economic policies, and encourages more institutional linkages
(Mintz, 1970). A successful currency area needs a reasonable degree of policy and preference
compatibility (Haberler, 1970; Tower and Willet, 1976).
• The similarity of supply and demand shocks and business cycles is the so-called meta-
property because it captures the interaction between several properties. In fact, membership
of a monetary union implies forgoing national exchange rate and monetary policy. In this
case, adjustment costs depend directly on the asymmetry of the shocks an economy faces: if
all member countries of a monetary union face the same shocks, there are no costs of having a
common policy. Thus, the above conditions (e.g., fiscal integration, wage and price flexibility)
are not necessary (Cohen and Wyplosz, 1989; Corden, 1972; Ishiyama, 1975; Mundell, 1973;
Tower and Willet, 1976) .
aThe domain of an OCA is given by the sovereign countries choosing to adopt a single currency or to
peg their exchange rates irrevocably.
bThe “new” OCA theory deals with, among others, the effectiveness of monetary policy (Alesina, Barro
and Tenreyero, 2002; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), credibility of monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott,
1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983), endogeneity versus specialization hypothesis of OCAs (Frankel and Rose,
1997; Frankel, 1999; De Grauwe and Mongelli, 2004), character of shocks (Buiter, 1995), synchronization of
business cycles and political factors (Collins, 1996, Edwards,1996).
Two aspects of monetary union issues are worth mentioning because both are mainly used in order
to evaluate regional integration initiatives. The first is the importance of the criterion of business cycle
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synchronization (or the similarity of shocks) for the sustainable operation of a common currency area.
In addition to the fact that this property captures the interaction between several OCA criteria, as
noted in Box 3.2, the synchronization of business cycles is important to the extent that the currency
union’s common monetary policy is influenced by the union-wide business cycle. Therefore, in order for
individual monetary policies to be substituted by a common monetary policy efficiently (i.e., to have a
“one size fits all” efficient monetary policy) member countries’ business cycles need to be related closely
to the union-wide business cycle. In the contrary case, if a “one size fits none” common monetary
policy exists, the cost of joining the monetary union would be negative (Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006;
Furceri and Karras, 2008; Savva, Neanidis, and Osborn, 2010; Se´bastien, 2009). Consequently, the
existence of business cycle synchronization among the currency area members facilitates the stabilizing
intervention of the common central bank (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999; Crowley and Schultz, 2010;
Furceri and Karras, 2008; Rogoff, 1985). Moreover, the synchronization of business cycles not only
is a prerequisite for the adoption of a common currency area but the very survival of the monetary
union depends on the commonality of business cycle fluctuations (Bergman, 2006).18
Second, the endogeneity issue arises when studying the link between economic integration and
shock asymmetry, in the sense of the OCA criteria.19 The “endogeneity of the OCA criteria,” a term
introduced by Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998), is formulated reflecting on the Lucas (1976)-critique:
currency union must be understood as a fundamental change of the policy regime; hence, it affects
the underlying OCA criteria in such a way that they are more likely to be satisfied ex-post as both
monetary and trade integration deepen.20 Using a number of approaches, the literature has supported
this endogenous character of the OCA criteria robustly (i.a., Frankel, 2004; Lee and Azali, 2010;
Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Reggio, 2010; Mendonc¸a, Silvestre, and Passos, 2011).
An enormous body of empirical literature studies the business cycle synchronization degree between
countries in a region, and/or the similarity of responses to shocks within a zone in order to evaluate
regional integration initiatives.
In addition, the process of economic integration, in the sense of Balassa’s stages, must be accom-
panied by the tightening of financial links between countries. Indeed, the main CM feature is the
free movement of factors (e.g., physical and financial capital, labor) within a region (see Table 4),
and thus, the establishment of a CM requires the countries of a region to reduce their restrictions on
capital movement, that is, to engage in a process of financial integration.
Balassa (1961a)’s theory relates stages of integration to discrimination measures so that an ad-
vancement through the former implies a reduction of the latter (see Table 5). Such a description
according to stages would seem to imply a rigid consecutive process. Nevertheless, there is no reason
to believe that an economic integration process must start with an FTA, nor that an FTA would
necessarily evolve toward higher stages (Sapir, 2011). Indeed, each movement from an FTA to a
CU, or from a CU to a CM, and so on, constitutes a huge political step. Hence, a high number of
FTAs remains FTAs for years (e.g., the Latin American Integration Association, LAIA) whereas new
associations directly emerge as CUs (e.g., Mercosur). Certainly, many countries enter into FTAs but
very few are willing to relinquish sovereignty over their trade policies. Indeed, less than 5% of all the
preferential trade agreements that have been notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) are
CUs rather than FTAs. According to the WTO, from about 264 RTAs notified to the WTO under
GATT Article XXIV that were in force as of October 8, 2014, only 15 are CUs.21
As a matter of fact, although Balassa’s stages are recognized widely as the standard framework,
18Business cycle synchronization may exist; however, the cycles could have different amplitudes due to non-convergence
(i.e., synchronization does not necessarily imply that economic convergence occurs). Indeed, while synchronization means
similar co-movements of countries’ growth rates, the term “convergence” is related to the convergence hypothesis of
countries’ economic growth: the catch-up effect between countries’ growth rates (Crowley and Schultz, 2010).
19As highlighted by the survey in Baldwin (2006), there is substantial evidence that monetary unification induces
countries to trade more with each other (i.a., Frankel and Rose, 1998). Indeed, as countries with closer trade links tend
to have more correlated business cycles, the adoption of a common currency increases business cycle correlations and it
becomes easier to meet the OCA criteria.
20See also Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) and Rose (2000) for a discussion.
21Among the RTAs that are not CUs are the Mercosur, Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom),
East African Community (EAC), Russian Federation–Belarus–Kazakhstan, EU–San Marino, Southern African Customs
Union, Economic Community of West African States, CEMAC, Central American Common Market (CACM), Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, EU–Turkey, EU–Andorra, ACN, West African Economic and Monetary Union,
and Eurasian Economic Community (see http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx).
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Integration stage Features Examples*
1. Free trade area
(FTA)
• No tariffs or quotas against
member countries.
• Individual quotas against third
countries.
• On January 1, 2008, the
US, Canada, and Mexico re-
moved the last remaining tar-
iffs between them, complet-
ing the North-American FTA
(NAFTA). The NAFTA came
into force in 1994.
• The ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA) was launched in 1992.
The whole ASEAN area is
scheduled to become a fully-
fledged FTA in the coming
years.
2. Customs Union
(CU)
• No tariffs or quotas against
member countries.
• Common external tariff.
• The European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) was created in
1957. The EEC disappeared
in 2009 via the Treaty of Lis-
bon and merged as the Euro-
pean Union (EU).
• The Southern Common Mar-
ket (Mercosur, 1991) and the
Andean Community of Nations
(ACN, 1969) are incomplete
CUs.
3. Common Mar-
ket (CM)
• No tariffs or quotas against
member countries.
• Common external tariff.
• Free factor movement, including
labor.
• The EU was created in 1993 by
the Maastricht Treaty.
4. Economic
and Monetary
Union (EUN)
• No tariffs or quotas against
member countries.
• Common external tariff.
• Free factor movement, including
labor.
• Harmonization of economic
policies and single currency.
• The European Monetary Union
(EMU) and the euro were estab-
lished in January 1999.
5. Total
Economic Inte-
gration (TEI)
• No tariffs or quotas against
member countries.
• Common external tariff.
• Free factor movement, including
labor.
• Harmonization of economic
policies and single currency.
• Unification of monetary, fiscal,
social, and counter-cyclical poli-
cies.
• Requires a binding supra-
national organization.
• The US, which has had a federal
governance system since 1789.
*Note: The provisional enforcement dates correspond to de jure economic regional integration, or
the official signatory dates of the creation treaties. In some cases, the effective implementation
of the measures specified by the integration agreements (de facto integration) is not finished. For
instance, the AFTA, Mercosur, and ACN are de jure agreements because de facto integration has
not been achieved yet, and thus, they are incomplete FTAs and CMs.
Source: Adapted from Balassa (1961a); Dorrucci, Firpo, Fratzscher, and Mongelli (2004); Essien
(2014)
Table 4: Balassa’s stages of economic integration.
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FTA CU CM CUN TEI
No tariffs or quotas X
Common external tariff X X
Free flow of factors X X X
Harmonization of economic policies X X X X
Unification of politics and political institutions X X X X X
Sources: Balassa (1961a); Suarez (2009).
Table 5: Stages of economic integration and removal of discrimination.
it cannot be used to study the South American integration project properly. Indeed, the Unasur does
not fit in any of the defined stages of economic integration: it is neither an FTA nor a CM, even if
it encompasses an FTA (ACN) and a CM (Mercosur).22 Balassa’s theory is adapted correctly to the
European case because it was conceived by studying it. Notwithstanding, while the European case
is an economically driven regional integration process, the South American one is politically driven.
More than an economic grouping, the Unasur is a space for political discussion among congregating
countries that historically have formed a number of FTAs and an incomplete CM. As far as regional
economic integration is concerned, it is notable that further evolution toward superior stages (in the
sense of Balassa) would require a significant level of political agreement. Therefore, the Unasur acts as
a powerful ally of economic integration, that is, political measures, detailed in Section 3, spill over to
the economic sphere.23 In summary, Balassa’s traditional framework is not applicable to all regional
integration projects owing to the driving forces of specific cases.
3.3 Political integration
International political integration can be understood as a characteristic aspect of an international
integration process through which groupings are created between nations without the use of violence
(Lindberg, 1970). According to Lindberg (1970), nations group together because of i) feelings of mu-
tual amity, confidence, and identification (social community); ii) expectations that common problems
will be resolved without recourse to large-scale violence (secure community); or, iii) the existence of
intense concentrations of economic exchange or free circulation of productive factors (economic inte-
gration). It is said that political integration occurs if these linkages trigger or are the result of joint
participation in ongoing decision making. Following this reasoning, political integration, as part of a
more inclusive process—in this case, regional integration can be defined as “the evolution over time
of a collective decision-making system among nations” (Lindberg, 1970). Such a definition implies
that the governments of the member countries forego part of their sovereignty and decision-making
autonomy in order to create and use common resources to be committed in the pursuit of common
objectives.
As the actual world is divided politically into autonomous but interdependent nation states, a
number of principles, practices, and common institutions are needed for organizing such international
political integration into a regional order (e.g., defining collective norms that are binding on the states,
and setting rules directly applicable to private players). In other words, a key role is played by regional
governance (or governance without government (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992))—defined as the “sum
of the many ways that individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”
(O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte, and Williams, 2000).2425
22The ACN includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The Mercosur includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The Unasur includes all Mercosur and ACN members, in addition to Chile, Suriname,
and Guyana.
23Note that the political component is also the driver of business cycle co-movements (Alesina, Mirrlees, and Neumann,
1989; Chang, Kim, Tomljanovich, and Ying, 2013; Jackman and Moore, 2008).
24An alternative definition of governance is that of Pascal Lamy, former director-general of the WTO, who under-
stands governance as the “set of transactions allowing the formulation, determination, legitimization, implementation of
collective norms and rules, as well as controlling their compliance” (Jacquet, Pisani-Ferry, and Tubiana, 2002, CAE’s
Report).
25The term regional governance is used to describe a multiplicity of public and private actors involved before (agenda
setting) and after (implementation) of decision making. These actors are more or less integrated into networks, and thus,
maintain non-hierarchical relationships.
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The foregoing of national sovereignty and decision-making autonomy in order to evolve further
toward regional integration is at the core of the current debate on economic integration because the
European sovereign debt crisis has revealed that a monetary union cannot work without a politi-
cal union (Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz, 2012; Issing, 2011; Sapir, 2011). Consequently, the
economic integration–political integration relationship is key for regional integration. Such is its im-
portance that the interdependence of economic and political aspects has been stressed since very early
in the regional integration debates. Already in 1841, Frederick List affirmed that economic union and
political union are inseparable. In 1889, Vilfrido Pareto, at the Peace Congress at Rome, asserted that
economic integration must lead to political integration. His argument is that CUs and other inter-
national economic organizations constitute powerful instruments for improving political relationships.
Moreover, according to Paul P. Streeten (1961), political and strategic motivations are more impor-
tant than strictly economic ones. Even Balassa, whose contributions focus mostly on the economic
factors of integration, states categorically that political interests can determine the first step towards
integration, but the economic objectives also influence politic matters: if the initial motivations are
economic, the need for political unity can appear in a subsequent stage—for example, when estab-
lishing a common external tariff (CU stage), when adopting a common economic policy and single
currency (economic union stage), and when instituting a federalist system (total economic integration
stage) (Balassa, 1961a).26
CAPITAL MOBILITY
MONETARY AUTONOMYFIXED EXCHANGE RATES
Floating
Exchange Rates
Gold 
Standard
Bretton Woods
Figure 1: Standard trilemma: the open economy trilemma.
Experience has taught us, as discussed in Rodrik (2000), that there is not full compatibility between
markets becoming international (economic integration) and politics remaining local. According to
Rodrik (2000), in order to be integrated perfectly, markets for goods, services, and production factors
need not be restricted by political and legal jurisdictions demarcated by national borders. Indeed, a
wide range of studies confirms a strikingly large effect of national borders on trade (e.g., Bayoumi and
Klein, 1997; Chen, 2004; Helliwell, 1998; McAusland and Millimet, 2013). For instance, although there
is an absence of significant formal tariff and non-tariff barriers, cultural or linguistic differentiation,
and other economic obstacles between the United States (US) and Canada, trade between the two
neighbors appears to have a depressing effect on commerce because of transaction costs generated by
discontinuities in their political and legal systems.27
Such an incompatibility is illustrated by Rodrick 2000 using an extension to the well-known “open
economy trilemma” (see Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998) or “impossible trinity”—that is, the impossibility
of reconciling free trade and capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, and monetary autonomy (see Figure
1)—28which he calls “the political trilemma of the world economy” or “the augmented trilemma.”
Figure 2 displays Rodrik’s political trilemma. It is possible to have at most two of the following
26Viner (1950) is among the few who disagree; he considers that CUs are primarily “non-political institutions.”
27The difference of political and legal jurisdictions across the national borders of trade partners could generate inade-
quate contract enforcement and thereby impose drastic costs on trade (see Anderson and Marcouiller, 1999, for empirical
evidence).
28The term “impossible trinity” is used commonly to state the possibility of having at most two of the three following
features: total capital mobility and free trade, fixed exchange rates, and monetary autonomy.
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three situations: international economic integration, the nation state, and mass politics (see Figure 2
for the definitions of these three options).
According to this dilemma, total international integration is compatible either with nation states
or with mass politics. In the first case, the choice is between total economic integration and the nation
state, or the “Golden straitjacket.”29 In order to achieve total economic integration, the domain
of national politics would be significantly restricted so that national jurisdictions would not distort
economic transactions (i.e., national politics would restrain the working of democratic mechanisms
significantly). In the second case, the choice is between total economic integration and mass politics,
or “Global federation,” and the attainment of full international integration would be feasible owing
to the institution of global federalism that eliminates a “border effect” and accords jurisdictions
with the market. The former situation illustrates the necessity for political integration in order to
move forward to economic integration.30 Because the third option of this political trilemma, that is,
the choice between the nation state and mass politics, or the “Bretton Woods compromise,” leaves
out economic integration entirely, it is out of the scope of this study. Moreover, the technological
improvements in communications and transportation required for the current globalized era make it
very unlikely that a region would be faced with this choice, shown in Figure 2.
The US and EU systems offer closer illustrations of the “Global federation” and “Golden straight-
jacket” situations, respectively (see Rodrik, 2012). Of course, they are regional situations rather than
global ones.31
Rodrik’s abovementioned reflection supports the argument that regional integration needs to re-
flect both economic and political aspects. Furthermore, regional governance is needed for organizing
purposes. Thus, Balassa’s stages of economic integration offer a restricted method of analysis. Indeed,
as asserted by the Jacquet, Pisani-Ferry, and Tubiana (2002, CAE’s report) at a global level, the anal-
ysis of a regional economic order should be based on two dimensions, namely, integration (horizontal
axis in Figure 3) and solidarity (vertical axis in Figure 3). As far as governance is concerned, the
former dimensions may be associated with two views of the economic order. The first emphasizes the
establishment of stable game rules so that the free-market ideal can be fulfilled. To do so, regional
governance removes political considerations. On the contrary, the second view assumes the existence
of common economic and non-economic objectives. Thus, regional governance is an extension of the
policy of national governments (as detailed in section 3, this appears to be the case of the South
American integration initiative).
On this basis, two traditional models and three emerging modalities of governance have been
developed in the literature. As summarized in Figure 4, the traditional models, institutionalized coop-
eration, in which nation states organize themselves in order to achieve their objectives cooperatively,
and federal regional government, which corresponds to Rodrik’s federalism, are characterized by a
large political component and represents progressive forms of cooperation. The emerging modalities,
the network of independent authorities, or cooperation at an institutional level (e.g., the Governing
Council of the European Central Bank), law outside the framework of a state, which emphasizes the
capacity of jurisprudence to produce a set of norms using a narrow legal base (e.g., the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Body and the Unasur Constitutive Treaty), and private self-regulation, which is applied
by default to sectors that are not publicly regulated, are being debated as alternative options because
the traditional models are no longer adapted to the global reality (Jacquet, Pisani-Ferry, and Tubiana,
2002, CAE’s Report). However, the regional reality is somewhat different. For instance, federalism
does work in the US and institutionalized cooperation appears to be the chosen alternative in emerging
and developing regions, such as South America. It is noteworthy, however, that the regional reality
is not independent of the global one. Therefore, like in all regions in the world, some sectors of the
South American continent actually apply more than one of the emerging models of governance.
Certainly, the real world exists somewhere in between the three parts of the political trilemma
(Figure 2) and combines several governance modalities, notably, emerging countries (Figure 4). To
29The choice between total economic integration and the nation state was named the “Golden straitjacket” by Friedman
(1999). In this case, while markets become international, the maintenance of national jurisdiction sovereignty causes
politics to be exerted over a much smaller domain.
30See Rodrik (2000) and Rodrik (2012) for further details on the “political trilemma of the world economy.”
31In addition, this topic is debated at a governance level, as in Rodrik (2012). Such a debate is out of the scope of
this thesis.
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solidarity and diversity 
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of regionalism 
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federal model is applicable. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Jacquet, Pisani-Ferry, and Tubiana (2002, CAE’s Report)
Figure 3: Two dimensions of the economic world order: “integration” and “solidarity”
which side the worldwide trend will lean is an open question and will probably remain so for a long
time. Notwithstanding, at a regional level, the debate is alive and well, and aims to establish strategies
to overcome the economic and financial difficulties triggered by the “Great Recession”—that is, the US
financial meltdown, the Eurozone debt disaster, and subsequent global financial stress.32 Indeed, not
only European countries, which were strongly affected by the European sovereign debt crisis (Lane,
2012), but also African, American, and Asian regional groupings are discussing the need to make
both political and economic decisions to face the crisis together.33 For instance, the French political
scientist Alain Rouquie´, in his speech on “Latin America after the Crisis,” emphasizes the importance
of regional integration during periods of crisis and asserts that “the time has come to realize that
global is inefficient, the nation-State is insufficient and (...) regional is indispensable.”34 Manifestly,
the role of political integration in regional integration is key and the relationship between between
political integration and economic integration is narrow.
32The term “Great Recession” is used to refer to the general economic downfall observed in world markets since the
US subprime mortgage crisis and financial crisis of 2007–08 spread all over the world. The term “Great Recession”
was adopted because this crisis is the most intense economic-financial turmoil since the 1930s “Great Depression” (see
Almunia, Be´ne´trix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke, and Rua, 2010; Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2010; Krugman, 2009; Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2014, for parallels between the Great Depression and Great Recession).
33The European crisis began as a liquidity crisis (2007–2009), and subsequently, transformed into a solvency crisis.
The European sovereign debt crisis revealed the necessity to implement common financial regulation measures by adopt-
ing a new kind of governance when a high degree of regional economic integration is achieved. Indeed, as asserted
by De Grauwe (2012), when entering a monetary union, countries become fragile and vulnerable to changing market
sentiments. According to him, the new European governance structure, the European Stability Mechanism, does not
fully acknowledge such fragility. Thus, it is necessary for the region to take collective action, for instance, budgetary
unification (De Grauwe, 2012) and political integration (Lane, 2012), suggesting a further evolution towards federalism.
34On June 9, 2009, Alain Rouquie´ gave an address at ECLAC headquarters in Santiago, Chile during the conference
“Latin America’s Regional Option after the Crisis.”
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3.4 Physical integration
Physical (or infrastructure) integration is the coordinated provision of infrastructure and its services—
e.g., construction of communication channels by connecting transport, energy, and telecommunications
networks at a regional level, among two or more neighboring nations’ governments, resulting in further
regional economic interdependence.35 Physical integration is the third, and less talked-about, aspect
of regional integration, and yet, it generates a number of economic dynamics. For instance, as most
of the studies reveal, public investment in national infrastructure not only impacts productivity (e.g.,
Canning, 1999; Cohen and Morrison Paul, 2004; Rioja, 1999)36 and economic growth (Canning and
Pedroni, 2008; Pradhan, Arvin, Norman, and Bele, 2014; Sahoo and Dash, 2012),37 but also indi-
rectly benefits economic integration in a number of ways. As argued by Bougheas, Demetriades, and
Morgenrot (1999, 2003), a large part of government investment allocated to improving and expanding
communication and transportation networks is aimed to reduce trade costs and facilitate trade of
goods. Consequently, “infrastructure spillovers” originate, meaning that such a transportation cost
reduction favors trade of goods both within and across national borders. Therefore, both home and
foreign producers and consumers are likely to profit from any infrastructure investment by the do-
mestic country. Thus, such “infrastructure spillovers” influence economic integration. There are good
reasons to accept the validity of the former reasoning beyond the simple observation of the real world,
as follows.
Box 3.3. What is Infrastructure?
Numerous possible definitions have been conferred on the term infrastructure or “social overhead
capital.” From an economic standpoint, the most sensible definition is large capital-intensive natural
monopolies, such as highways and additional transportation amenities, communications systems,
and water and sewer lines. Because these systems can be owned publicly or privately, an alternative
definition is the publicly owned tangible capital stock only. Broader definitions include progressively
human capital investment and research and development capital (Gramlich, 1994).
Papers dealing with infrastructure issues cite the World Development Report 1994 extensively. It
focuses on economic infrastructure, including: public utilities (power, telecommunications, piped
water supply, sanitation and sewerage, solid waste collection and disposal, and piped gas); public
works (roads and major dam and canal works for irrigation and drainage); and other transportation
sectors (urban and inter-urban railways, urban transport, ports, waterways, and airports).
As there is no widely consensual definition, unless otherwise stated, this thesis focuses on economic
infrastructure, including transport, energy, and telecommunications.
On the one hand, the role of infrastructure in determining transportation costs, and thereby trade
volumes, is well reported by the empirical literature (e.g., Francois and Manchin, 2013; Limao and
Venables, 2001; Shepherd and Wilson, 2006). Indeed, particularly in the case of developing countries,
a trade enhancement does not depend exclusively on tariff reductions (WTO, 2011). In addition,
tradesmen face other beyond-border and at-border trade costs, such as transit bottlenecks, onerous
procedures, and inefficient communication networks. Such trade amenity constraints significantly
affect trade volumes (Limao and Venables, 2001; Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2012; Wilson, Mann,
and Otsuki, 2003, 2005). Then, there is evidence that overcoming these trade limitations procures
higher trade gains than a lessening of trade policy barriers (e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003;
Hoekman and Nicita, 2010, 2011).
On the other hand, evidence for the existence of infrastructure spillovers has been provided using
US and EU country data. Concerning studies focusing on the US, Cohen and Morrison Paul (2004)
and Pereira and Andraz (2010) provide evidence that public highway infrastructure investments cause
significant inter-state spillovers, notably for regions that are highly integrated economically (Pereira
and Andraz, 2010). However, Cohen and Morrison Paul (2003)’s findings suggest that the expansion
of airport infrastructure in one state positively affects both own-state manufacturing output and the
production of the other states connected to it by the air transport network. With regard to EU nations,
35See Table 3.3 for a detailed definition of the term “Infrastructure”.
36Literature surveys by Gramlich (1994), Sturm and De-Haan (1995) and Sturm, Kuper, and De-Haan (1998) identify a
number of studies that provide evidence for the existence of a strong productive effect of public infrastructure investments.
37See Romp and de Haan (2007) for a complete survey including early works.
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Del Bo and Florio (2008) support the view that investing in the overall infrastructure network of road
and railways, including 262 European regions, yields a positive and significant return.38
Although the investment in transportation infrastructure is most likely to influence regional inte-
gration positively, investments in all kinds of infrastructure facilities, notably, energy, and telephone
and internet networks, may indirectly benefit integration, primarily between neighboring regions, even
if separated by national borders. Such an indirect benefit arises in the form of an externality. Indeed,
as noted by Canning (1999), not only transportation but also communication (e.g., telephone and
internet) infrastructure may interconnect markets and expand competition levels. For instance, as a
pure externality, better communication networks may improve the degree of diffusion of technology,
increasing output without necessarily increasing the demand for infrastructure use. Alternatively,
two monopolists in different markets may reduce their prices once the connectivity between markets
improves, even if no movement of a good between markets actually takes place.
The last piece of evidence suggests that a pure unilateral investment in infrastructure generates
a number of dynamics for pro-integration. If this is the case, coordinated provision of infrastructure
is likely to result in stronger benefits in terms of integration. Indeed, Figuie`res, Prieur, and Tidball
(2013), by dynamically analyzing a two-country general equilibrium endogenous growth model, con-
cludes that when two governments strategically supply productive infrastructure, the countries tend
to converge to the same balanced growth path (i.e., their growth rates are identical on the balanced
growth path), despite the fact that they exhibit heterogeneous preferences and technologies.39 Fur-
thermore, the authors compare the case of cooperative financing of public investment in infrastructure
in one country with centralized financing in another country, and conclude that when the two countries
have different balanced growth rates and do not display consumption home bias, cooperation reduces
the gap between their growth rates, meaning that they converge.40
Apart from evidence on the impacts of infrastructure investment on integration, a rich body
of literature suggests that adequate provision of infrastructural services is a key component of the
economic development of nations (e.g., Caldero´n and Serve´n, 2010; Duffy-Deno and Eberts, 1991;
Kandilov and Renkow, 2010; Kim, 2014). This is crucial for regional integration among developing
countries because, as noted in Section 2, developing countries have perceived regional integration
traditionally as a development strategy. Therefore, physical integration has the potential to not only
increase economic integration, and thereby regional integration, but also to drive developing countries
towards their development aims.
After the World Development Report 1994 (WDR-94) identified that the citizens of developing
countries continued to lack proper infrastructure services, despite increases in investment in new in-
frastructure, it became evident that not only the quantity of infrastructure stock needed to increase
but also the quality of infrastructure services needed to improve. Indeed, the WDR-94 asserts that in-
efficient and wasteful provision of infrastructure services, inadequate maintenance of the infrastructure
stock, and misallocation of new infrastructure project investment are key hindrances for development.
Moreover, it is widely recognized that a serious obstacle for regional integration between developing
countries, notably those in Africa and Latin America, is deficient and sparse regional infrastructure
networks, such as sparse road and rail networks with significant missing links and important oper-
ational capacity problems; congested and inefficient regional ports; deficient electricity supply; and
sparse access to information and telecommunications technology (Kessides, 2012). Such constraints
and bottlenecks increase cross-border transaction costs, and thus, restrict competitiveness and eco-
nomic growth (Baldwin, 2006; De Melo, Montenegro, and Panagariya, 1992; Kessides, 2012).
38This is probably why the financing of infrastructure projects and the coordination of public investment by EU
members appears to have been one of the four priorities of the Lisbon strategy 2000–2010 (Lisbon European Council,
2000). As part of the Lisbon strategy 2000–2010, the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) was created by
European policymakers. The TENT-T include the railway axis connecting Berlin, Verona, Milano, Bologna, Napoli,
Messina, and Palermo and the high-speed railway axis linking Paris, Brussels, Koln, Amsterdam, and London.
39This result holds only under the assumption of constant returns to scale.
40Button (1998) surveys earlier studies contributing to the debate on how endogenous growth and infrastructure
availability interact and how such interaction influences the natural potential for regional economic convergence of
endogenous growth processes.
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Box 3.4. Why is physical integration important?
The ECLAC identifies a number of reasons why it is important to address physical integration at
a regional level. Among others, physical integration
1. permits effective economic and political integration (without infrastructure, neither of these
aspects of integration would be possible);
2. is crucial if greater social equity is to be achieved and asymmetries among countries are to
be reduced;
3. has ample potential to foster unity, peace, and development;
4. allows countries to solve shared problems jointly, such as physical bottlenecks, missing com-
munication segments, and trade obstacles, while at the same time stimulating the creation or
reorganization of productive chains, facilitating more competitive participation in the world’s
major markets, favoring the harmonization of public policy and regulatory frameworks among
countries and sectors, fostering the development of geographically isolated areas, bringing
about decentralized development, and reducing trade and distribution costs, and so on;
5. promotes decision making based on mutual gain for participating countries, allowing them to
move beyond possible political or diplomatic differences in order to make progress in concrete
matters;
6. more actively incorporates the participation and input of local governments and the private
sector, through the process of developing, financing, building or operating physical integra-
tion projects.
In summary, infrastructure not only increases productivity and lowers production costs, thereby
extending trade of goods and services, it also facilitate development and regional integration, par-
ticularly when combined with coordinated behavior in its provision. Therefore, the role of physical
integration is key for regional integration. Indeed, according to the ECLAC, “developing infrastruc-
ture projects within a framework of regional integration policies permits the internationalization of the
infrastructure services provided, contributes to the countries’ economic, political and social integra-
tion, and helps make up for some of the shortfalls in certain natural resources that may affect some
countries” (ECLAC, 2009, ; p. 2).
Box 3.4 summarizes the reasons why physical integration is important for regional integration
identified by the ECLAC.
4 Conclusion
The sustainability of economically integrated zones is at the core of a debate since the recent euro
debt crisis revealed flaws with the European Monetary Union (Lane, 2012), and yet, a number of new
economic associations have been formed since the early 1990s. The debate has highlighted the major
role of political integration (Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz, 2012; Issing, 2011; Sapir, 2011),
notably the necessity for political unification in order to complete the process of economic integration.
Based on the South American integration project, this paper proposed a novel approach for dealing
with regional integration issues that include not only political matters but also physical aspects. More
specifically, this article proposed to analyze any regional integration project from three complementary
angles, namely: economic integration, political integration, and physical integration. Moreover, it
argues that political and physical integration constitute a preliminary, or contemporaneous, step
toward economic integration, and not a final stage, as the current debate proposes. In other words,
a zero-stage in (Balassa, 1961b)’s theory of economic integration is needed to enable the long-term
sustainability of a regional bloc.
As detailed in Section 3.2, there is very rich literature on economic integration. Each one of
(Balassa, 1961b)’s stages has been the object of numerous studies and the European region is by far
the most studied. In fact, the theory of economic integration was conceived from the construction of
the European integration project. Thus, the natural belief is that political integration follows economic
integration and completes it. Contrary to this view, by considering the South American experience,
this paper suggests that literature on regional integration should analyze the potential pro-economic
integration outcomes of organizing political and physical integration instead of focus exclusively on
economic integration. As surveyed in Subsection 3.3, the economic integration–political integration
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relationship is well documented in the literature. Political integration is key in regional governance
debates. Completing economic integration with political unification creates a regional governance
dilemma (Rodrik (2000)’s political trilemma). The Unasur have dealt with such a dilemma since the
beginning of its integration project by creating institutionalized cooperation (as exposed by Figure
4–Subsection 3.3). The physical integration–economic integration relationship is the proposed novel
dimension of regional integration. As shown in Subsection 3.4, the coordinated provision of public
infrastructure is very likely to cause “infrastructure spillovers” for economic integration.
The argument defended here about the pro-economic integration potential of taking political and
physical integration measures must not be interpreted as a claim against the importance of taking
economic measures. While the actual political- and physical- integration efforts are certainly laying the
groundwork for the creation of a sustainable economically integrated bloc, economic integration efforts
are also needed in order to attain complete regional integration. Political and physical aspects are
proposed as first, or complementary, stages and do not replace any economic integration measures. The
discussion about which of the three dimensions, economic, political, or physical, should be privileged
is out of the scope of this paper. However, its is clear that, for the Unasur to continue progressing
toward elimination of regional discrimination and asymmetries, economic integration policies must
also be adopted.
In general, this paper states that a new outlook is need for integrally evaluating regional integration.
The three dimensional proposal is justified to be a good option. Thus, researchers’ efforts should
concentrate on this.
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